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Abstract 
People tend to be inadequately sensitive to the extent of their own 
knowledge. This insensitivity typically emerges as overconfidence. That is, 
people's assessments of the probability of having answered questions correctly 
are typically too high compared to the portion of questions they get right. 
Few debiasing procedures have proven effective against this problem. Those 
that have worked seem to be directive in character. Rather than improving 
subjects' feeling for how much they know, such procedures may have suggested 
to subjects how their probability assessments should be changed. These 
successful manipulations include giving feedback and requiring subjects to 
provide reasons contradicting their chosen answers. The present study 
attempted to improve the appropriateness of confidence with a nondirective 
method. Subjects were asked to sort items into a specified number of piles 
according to their confidence in the correctness of their answers. Sub-
sequently, they assigned a number to each pile expressing the probability that 
each item in the pile was correct. It emphasizes confidence assessment over 
fact assessment; it forces the comparison of knowledge levels for different 
questions, it deemphasizes the need to produce numbers; it gives different 
hints as to the fineness of the discrimination that assessors can make. This 
procedure differed from its predecessors in many respects; nonetheless, 
performance here was indistinguishable from that observed elsewhere. Although 
some small pockets of improvement were noted, confidence was largely resistant 
to this manipulation. Such robustness is discouraging for the developer of 
elicitation procedures, encouraging for the student of judgmental processes. 
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Categorical Confidence 
Whenever there is uncertainty, it can be important to know its extent. In 
business, technology, or everyday life, understanding the limits to one's 
knowledge is an essential ingredient for wise decisions regarding when and how 
to act, as well as what additional information to acquire and what advisors to 
trust. As a result, explicit assessments of uncertainty play a central role 
in theories regarding processes as diverse as auditing financial statements 
[12], designing nuclear power plants [22], describing strategic balances [8], 
analyzing business decisions [20], interpreting eye witness testimony [3, 24], 
estimating physical constants [21], monitoring the operation of one's memory 
[9], and learning how to learn [25]. If there is any degree of communality to 
the way in which uncertainty is assessed in these different contexts, then the 
study of uncertainty assessment per se could produce widely useful results. 
This hope has generated a substantial body of research examining how people 
assess the limits of their own knowledge. Although the "how" of these 
processes has only been incompletely understood, the "how well" is fairly 
clear. People seem to have difficulty appraising uncertainty accurately. 
After describing these difficulties, the present article offers a new 
procedure for reducing them. 
In a typical uncertainty assessment task, participants first ponder some 
question of fact and then assess the likelihood that the answers they have 
produced are correct. Observation of such individuals suggests that they 
spend considerably more time on the first of these operations than on the 
second. A variety of possible reasons come to mind: (a) answers are harder 
to produce than probabilities; therefore they require more time; (b) people 
are more experienced in answering questions, hence, they can spend more time 
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profitably on that task; (c) until an answer is produced, one cannot even 
begin to assess its accuracy; or (d) people are more accustomed to having 
answers evaluated than probabilities and want to take greater care that the 
former are in order. 
Given these reasons for deemphasizing the probability assessment task, it 
should perhaps come as no surprise then that its quality is often poor. The 
most commonly observed result is that the magnitude of probability assessments 
is only roughly predictive of the actual likelihood that the associated 
answers will be correct. In most cases, correctness does increase as 
confidence increases. However, it increases too slowly. In many tasks, as 
people's assessed probabilities of being correct increase from .5 to 1.0, 
their actual probability of being correct increases from .5 to only about .8. 
People believe that they can distinguish between a greater range of states of 
knowledge than is actually the case. 
When tasks are difficult, a contrast between people's overall confidence 
and their overall accuracy reveals overconfidence; they make too many high 
confidence assessments. With easy tasks, one finds underconfidence. These 
patterns are very robust; they can be found with a variety of response modes, 
question topics, and levels of expertise (for reviews, see [5, 16, 23]). 
People have, moreover, considerable confidence in these confidence assessments 
(e.g., [7]). 
The few experimental manipulations that have managed to improve the 
appropriateness of confidence assessments have typically involved focusing 
people's attention on the assessment task in a fairly directive manner. For 
example, the quality of assessment improves when assessors are given extensive 
personalized feedback (e.g., [15, 18]), Another effective manipulation has 
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been requiring people to list explicitly reasons supporting and contradicting 
their choice of answer, prior to assessing the likelihood that it is correct 
[ 13 J. 
The secret of even these partial successes is, however, still unclear. It 
would be theoretically interesting anad practically useful if such simple 
manipulations were able to enhance people's ability to appraise their own 
knowledge. However, the improvement observed with these manipulations might 
come not from helping people focus on the assessment task but from some 
unintended cues as to how subjects should change their assessments. For 
example, because people do not ordinarily list contradicting reasons, the 
requirement to do so might be interpreted by some subjects as a hint to reduce 
their confidence. Feedback shows what assessments one should have used; it 
may be tempting just to reduce one's probability assessments mechanically, 
which would lead to better performance if training and test items were of 
equal difficulty. 
An obvious danger with such directive procedures is that whatever is 
learned may prove to be task specific, leaving one no better (or even more 
poorly) prepared to face a new task differing, say, in difficulty level. 
Learning that one is overconfident on a hard task might, in fact, induce 
exaggerated underconfidence on a subsequent easy task. These fears are 
alleviated somewhat by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff's [15] finding of modest 
generalization of training to some other tasks. Nonetheless, it would be 
comforting to know that confidence assessment could be improved by a technique 
that affected response usage only as a by-product of affecting understanding 
of how much one knows. 
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One simple, non-directive way to focus attention on the assessment task 
would be to provide people with a detailed lecture on the nature of the 
response mode, the properties of good assessments, and the kinds of biases 
that may be observed. Such instruction would prepare people for assessment in 
general, not just for one particular task, Unfortunately, however, it does 
not seem to work (see [15]; Note 1). 
The present experiment explores an alternative non-directive approach that 
differs in many ways from its predecessors. In it, judges first answer an 
entire set of two-alternative forced-choice questions. Then they sort the 
questions into a prescribed number of piles, each reflecting a different 
degree of confidence that the answers chosen for the items assigned to it are 
correct. Finally, after reviewing the results of the sorting procedure, 
judges assign a number to each pile expressing the probability that each item 
in the pile is correct. This procedure should emphasize confidence assessment 
over question answering. Moreover, within the assessment task it should focus 
attention on appraising one's feeling of knowing rather than on the production 
of a numerical expression of that feeling that the experimenter will find 
acceptable. Some explicit response is, of course, needed to communicate one's 
degree of confidence, but the careful formulation of a feeling of knowing 
should take precedence over the more technical task of translating it into a 
number [1]. 
One respect in which the present procedure is directive is in its 
specification of the number of categories that subjects are to use. That 
number might be reasonably interpreted by subjects as an indication of how 
many distinct categories they can reliably use. There is probably no way to 
avoid giving some direction on this topic. For example, the non-categorical 
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half-range probability scale [.5, 1.0] used in many studies seems to suggest 
to subjects that they can and should use all the "round" responses (.5, .6, 
.7, .8, .9, 1.0). One might even attribute the hypersensitivity observed in 
such studies to this implicit suggestion that they are able to make the 
discriminations corresponding to these six distinct levels of knowledge [4J. 
A final feature of this procedure that might have a salutary effect is 
that it forces subjects to read the entire set of questions before assessing 
their confidence in any. Upon entering an experiment, subjects may have some 
expectation regarding how difficult the questions will be. If that expect-
ation is erroneous, it might artificially buoy or depress their confidence 
levels until they had completed enough questions to realize that their 
assumption was in error [19]. 
Within the judgment and decision making literature, perhaps the most 
closely related study is one in which Gray [11] had third graders assess the 
percentage of questions that they would answer correctly from each of six 
piles of arithmetic problems. Although she did not evaluate the accuracy of 
these estimates, Gray did find that they were systematically related to her 
subjects choices of problems to tackle (undervarying rewards schemes). 
A more general reason in the literature for believing that this procedure 
will be efficacious is the proliferation of techniques such as the Q-sort [2, 
10]. Many investigators have found that when subjects have difficulty making 
direct qualitative estimates, that their task can be simplified by changing it 
to one requiring primarily comparative judgments. The Q-sort procedures 
accomplish this by having subjects sort alternatives into equivalence classes, 
akin to those being created here. That literature would lead one to expect 




Design. The experimental design involved four groups of subjects, each 
asked to sort 50 two-alternative questions into a prespecified number of piles 
(3, 4, 5, or 6) according to their degree of confidence in knowing the correct 
answer to each. After the sorting was completed, they assessed the prob-
ability that each answer in each pile was correct. 
Procedure. The details may be best understood by verbatim citation of 
relevant portions of the experimental instructions: 
For this task, we have prepared 50 general-knowledge items. Each 
item has two alternative answers, one of which is correct and one 
incorrect. Each item appears on a card. Your job is to: 
Step !--Separate the 50 cards, tearing them along the dotted lines 
(there are six (6) cards on each page). 
Step 2--Go through the cards and circle the letter a or the letter b 
to indicate which of the alternatives you think is the correct 
alternative. If you have no idea which alternative is correct, circle one 
of the two letters anyway--just guess. 
Step 3--Sort the cards into 3, [or 4, 5, or 6] piles according to how 
sure you are that you have circled the correct alternative. 
* One pile should contain all the cards for which you feel least 
confident; 
* One pile should contain all the cards for which you feel most 
confident; 
* The other pile(s) will have cards for which you have an 
intermediate feeling(s) of sureness. 
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Keep sorting and resorting until all the cards in a particular pile 
are those for which you feel the same level of certainty or uncertainty. 
You may, if you wish, do steps 2 and 3 at the same time. That is, 
you could take the first card, circle an answer, and immediately use that 
card to start one pile. Then take the second card, mark an answer on it, 
and then put it in a pile. And so on. 
Do not hesitate to rearrange the cards, moving them from pile to pile 
as needed. 
Step 4--When you are satisfied with your sorting, you must assign a 
number to each pile. This number expresses the probability, for each card 
in the pile, that you have indeed circled the correct alternative. This 
number expresses numerically the degree of certainty or uncertainty that 
you feel about each of the cards in the pile. 
The number you assign to each pile may be any number from .5 to 1.0. 
".5" means that, for each card in the pile, you felt completely uncertain 
as to which of the two answers is the correct answer. The number ".6" 
means that for each card in the pile, you felt 60% sure that you selected 
the correct answer and so forth. The number "1.0" means that you are 
completely sure that you have selected the correct answer for every card 
in the pile. 
* All the cards in one pile must be assigned the same probability. 
* Every pile must have a different probability. 
* You must use numbers from .5 to 1.0 inclusive, but you may pick any 
numbers from that range that seem appropriate. You do not have to use the 
numbers 1.0 and .5, but you may if they adequately express your degree of 
certainty/uncertainty for your most extreme piles, the ones you feel least 
and most confident about. 
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* You may use two-digit numbers (like .55 or .75) if you wish. 
* Do not use numbers like .4 or 1.2 that are outside the range .5 to 
1. o. 
Steps 5 and 6 told subjects how to write their responses, reemphasizing 
several key points and informing them that they would have 40 minutes to 
complete the task. In studies using the usual numerical response format, 
answering 50 questions typically consumes about 15 minutes, once instructions 
have been completed. 
Items. In order to facilitate comparisons between these responses and 
those produced by the usual response format, an item set was used that had 
been tested previously on subjects drawn from the same pool. Specifically, it 
was the "complete test/hard items" set, reported in Figure 9 of Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff [15]. Subjects there knew the answers to 61.7% of the items and 
responded with a mean probability of .758, reflecting substantial over-
confidence. 
Administration. One hundred seventy-five individuals participated, 
distributed over the four experimental groups according to their preference 
for the time at which the different groups were conducted. This task was the 
first of several unrelated tasks presented in sessions lasting approximately 
1-1/2 hours. Subjects were paid $6, and were recruited through an advertise-
ment in the University of Oregon student newspaper. 
Results 
Response usage. When the original group of subjects [15] responded to 
these items, the great majority (35 of 48) used six response categories. All 
but one of these individuals used the six "natural" responses (.5, .6, .7, .8, 
.9, 1.0). In the entire group of 48, all but two subjects used .5, indicating 
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"guess;· all but one used 1.0 1 indicating complete confidence. The bottom 
rows of Table 1 describe the responses of those subjects, both for the entire 
group and for those who used just six response categories. 
The top four lines of Table 1 show how the subjects in the present 
experiment coped with the constraint of not being able to make all possible 
responses. For those who sorted into six piles, this should have been a 
minimal constraint. In some respects, they used the response scale similarly 
to the unconstrained subjects. In particular, most availed themselves of the 
.5 and 1.0 options. Nonetheless, the constraint did have some effect, in that 
22 of the 45 six-pile subjects did not use the six "natural" responses, 
preferring other intermediate values between .5 and 1.0. The subjects who 
were allowed five categories typically gave up one of the intermediate 
responses, rather than one of the extreme responses, each of which was still 
used by about 90% of the subjects. The most pronounced effect was seen with 
the three-pile group which significantly reduced usage of 1.0.l Usage of .5, 
however, remained very high, indicating that "guess" was a more essential 
response than "certain." When subjects in the five- and six-pile groups (and 
in the original study) failed to use 1.0, their highest response was always in 
the .90-.99 range. A number of the subjects in the three- and four-pile 
groups had highest responses less than .9. 
Performance. Given these differences in response usage, there is some 
reason to expect differences in performance. Figure 1 and the remainder of 
Table 1 provide pertinent details. The calibration curves in Figure 1 show 
the percentage of correct responses associated with each level of confidence 
expressed by subjects (after collapsing those expressions into the categories, 
.5-.59, .6-.69, .7-.79, .8-.89, .9-.99, and 1.0 and representing each by its 
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mean). The similarities between these curves are more striking than are any 
differences. The curves for the various sort-and-label groups closely 
resemble one another; perhaps more importantly, they also resemble the curve 
for the unconstrained group from Lichtenstein and Fischhoff [15]. If the four 
sort-and-label groups are pooled, the resulting curve falls very close to the 
unconstrained group's curve. Sorting per se seems to have had no effect. 
This conclusion is generally borne out by the sunnnary statistics of Table 
1. The proportion correct column suggests that the focus on probability 
assessment may have slightly reduced the attention subjects paid to question 
answering, as they answered 2.2% fewer questions correctly than the uncon-
strained group. This difference (.595 vs •• 617) was not significant, however. 
Constrained subjects' mean confidence was correspondingly lower (.716 vs • 
• 737). As a result, the sort and non-sort groups have similarly high levels 
of overconfidence, which is computed as the signed difference between mean 
confidence and proportion correct. The various groups expressed confidence 
that was too confident by .11 to .14 on the average. In all these results, 
the only significant difference was between the 3-pile group, which was less 
confident than the 5-pile and unconstrained groups. 
"Calibration" is a statistic characterizing curves such as those in Figure 
1. It is the mean squared distance between each point in a curve and the 
identity line representing perfect calibration, weighted by the number of 
responses summarized in each point. Ideally, it should be O. These levels, 
too, are similar in the constrained and unconstrained groups, confirming the 
visual impression from the figure. 
Certainty. In previous research, the most extreme overconfidence has been 
observed with responses of 1.0. All of these should be associated with 
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correct answers; however, it is not uncommon to find 20% of those answers 
being incorrect. The third column shows that the sorting procedure signifi-
cantly reduced the percentage of subjects using 1.0 at all. As one would 
expect, the percentage of responses that were 1.0 was down sharply from the 
unconstrained group where they comprised one quarter of all responses. None-
theless, saying 1.0 less frequently did not increase the probability of being 
correct when subjects did so. Constrained subjects were still wrong about 20% 
of the time when they expressed certainty that they were right. Perhaps the 
clearest evidence that present procedure changed the frequency but not the 
manner in which subjects used 1.0 may be seen in the 3-pile group. Only half 
of these subjects used that response at all. As a group, though, they used 
the response half as much, indicating that the rate of use among users was 
just as high as before. And the probability of being correct was the same, 
indicating further that manner of use was unchanged. 
Fischhoff and MacGregor [6] observed in an unconstrained task that 
subjects who never used the 1.0 response were somewhat better calibrated than 
other subjects. This was not the case in the present study. Pooling across 
the four constrained groups, the 37 non-users of 1.0 were not appreciably 
better calibrated than the 138 users (figure not shown). Unfortunately for 
the sake of this comparison, non-users also had a lower proportion of correct 
answers than did users (.566 vs •• 603). Because calibration typically 
deteriorates as task difficulty increases [15], comparisons are somewhat 
ambiguous when difficulty varies. 
Discussion 
Although the sorting task affected subjects' choice of responses, it does 
not seem to have affected the appropriateness of those responses. Perhaps the 
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only glimmer of an effect, although not significant, is the slight superiority 
of the groups using fewer categories. Subjects in the three-pile and four-
pile groups had a bit better overall calibration than subjects using five~ or 
six-piles, despite having a slightly lower percentage of correct answers. 
Considering the variety of ways in which the present task differed from its 
predecessors, this is a meager haul. Accepting it at face value would lead 
one to believe that the appropriateness of people's confidence cannot be 
improved by any of the changes from the usual assessment procedure embodied in 
the sorting task: focusing attention on confidence assessment, comparing 
knowledge levels on different items, reducing the number of responses used, 
and eliminating whatever implicit cues are provided by the usual response 
format. 
Before accepting this conclusion, we decided to repeat the study using 
small-group rather than large-group administration, with the experimenter 
close at hand to answer any questions that arose. The tradeoff between these 
two designs is that proximity raises the risk of experimenter interference, 
but reduces the risk of subjects deviating from the prescribed task. Although 
subjects in Experiment 1 appeared to work quite hard, the groups were too 
large to ensure that every subject performed the task in the desired sequence. 
Group size may also have inhibited some subjects from asking clarifying 
questions regarding what might have seemed a moderately complicated procedure. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Experiment 2 repeated the three- and six-pile groups of Experiment 1 in 
order to see what, if any, effect would be obtained with the most extreme 
versions of the sort-and-label manipulations. Instead of large-group admin-
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istration, groups of about five people were brought to a small conference 
room. The experimenter read the instructions with them, discussed any ques-
tions, and remained during the course of the task. The continual presence of 
the experimenter made it possible to ensure that subjects were following the 
instructions. The presence of other, hardworking subjects seemed to encourage 
them to do so. Every attempt was made to avoid any communication between 
subjects or any hint from the experimenter regarding what responses to use. 
Subjects were recruited through the local state employment office. All 
had at least one year of higher education, making them generally comparable in 
educational background to the subjects in Experiment 1. Each individual was 
paid $8 for working two hours on completing this and a number of subsequent 
unrelated judgment tasks. Most subjects completed this task within 20 
minutes, not including the 10-15 minutes required for the experimenter to read 
and discuss the instructions. 
Results 
Response usage. The basic patterns of Experiment 1 were repeated. Of the 
30 six-pile subjects, only 9 did not use the natural responses (.5, ••• , 
1.0); of these 9, only three did not use one of the extreme categories (.5, 
1.0). As before, three-pile subjects made somewhat less use of .5 and 
significantly less use of 1.0. They used a wide variety of response sets; 
even the most popular (.5, .7, 1.0) was chosen by only 5 people. Details 
appear in Table 2. 
Performance. The various performance statistics show the sorting groups 
as a whole to be quite similar to the unconstrained group. Treated together, 
the constrained groups were slightly more often correct, and slightly more 
confident, leading to a similar level of overconfidence and similar overall 
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calibration. Performance when using 1.0 was also similar. Indeed, the one 
difference of note that does emerge is between the two sort groups. The 
three-pile group was better calibrated and less overconfident than the six-
pile group, as can be seen in both the summary statistics of Table 2 in the 
graphic representation of Figure 2. The six-pile group here actually per-
formed worse than the unconstrained group, most of whom used six responses 
spontaneously. Although these differences are statistically significant, the 
level of significance (p(.05) is too low to attribute very much importance to 
them, especially given the welter of non-differences observed here and in 
Experiment 2. 
Unlike Experiment I, subjects here who did not use 1.0 were somewhat 
better calibrated than those who did. Their calibration curves are compared 
in Figure 3, which replicates a pattern observed by Fischhoff and MacGregor 
[6]. The 47 subjects who used 1.0 expressed, on the average, slightly greater 
confidence in the correctness of their answers than the 12 who did not (.765 
vs •• 750), but got a smaller portion right (.619 vs •• 647). As a result, 
users of 1.0 were more overconfident than non-users (.146 vs •• 103). Although 
this does replicate a previous result, the sample size (12 subjects) and 
effect size are too small for it to be of more than speculative interest. 
Discussion 
The overall message of these data is that this rather drastic change in 
procedure had little effect on confidence assessment. The constraints of the 
procedure did induce sorting subjects to adopt somewhat different response 
patterns; however, the accompanying calibration was indistinguishable from 
that observed elsewhere. The only differences of any note were a weak sug-
gestion that calibration may improve as the number of categories decreases, 
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and feeble support for the previous observation that people who do not use 1.0 
tend to be better calibrated. 
From a practical perspective, these results have both good news and bad 
news. The bad news is that despite a rather concerted effort, we were no more 
successful than our predecessors in devising a simple, nondirective scheme for 
improving the quality of confidence assessments. The good news is that this 
robustness of confidence assessments gives elicitors great freedom in how they 
extract assessments from themselves or their clients. From a large set of 
methods, elicitors can choose whatever method seems most comfortable and 
natural without fear that the method itself will bias the results. 
From a theoretical perspective, these results are informative and even 
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encouraging. They point to the robustness of confidence effects and the 
generality of previous results. We have also learned some things about the 
cognitive processes involved in confidence assessment. The fact that putting 
the emphasis on probab.ility, rather than fact, assessment had no effect 
indicates that the probabilities are not neglected in the usual task. The 
fact that reading all items prior to responding had no effect indicates that 
even in the usual task, respondents are able to extract quickly as much 
information about the overall difficulty of the items they face as they can 
with a more thorough review. The fact that postponing the assignment of 
numbers had no effect indicates that producing quantitative assessments per se 
is not an obstacle. The fact that varying number of response possibilities 
had no effect indicates that the reason for poor calibration elsewhere was not 
that the natural response scale communicated a misleading message to subjects 
regarding the fineness of the discriminations that they can make between 
different degrees of uncertainty. 
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The sort-and-label procedure differed from traditional procedures on a 
number of dimensions. Had it had an effect, subsequent research would have 
been directed to assessing which dimension provided the effective element. 
Some of those dimensions are still of interest. For example, what determines 
how fine are the discriminations in level of knowledge that people believe 
they can make? How do people appraise the overall difficulty of a set of 
items and how does that appraisal affect how people create equivalence classes 
for feelings of knowing? Do they first make a crude partition (e.g., don't 
know, may know, certain) and then refine it into subsidiary categories, or do 
they build categories by matching items for which their knowledge levels seem 
equivalent? Variations on the present procedure could shed light on these 
questions. For the moment, though, the dominant impression is that confidence 
is determined by powerful psychological processes which have resisted the 
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and Peggy Roecker for much technical help. Correspondence may be addressed to 
Decision Research, 1201 Oak Street, Eugene, Oregon 97401. 
1. All significant tests reported in the text and tables are t-tests 
conducted with the generalized jackknife procedure [17]. Unlike procedures 
that compute statistics on individual subjects, jackknifing computes 
statistics on the entire set of data after each subject is deleted. It is a 
suitable procedure when the sampling distribution is unknown or when 
statistics computed for individual subjects are unstable. A particular 
problem with calibration statistics, which jackknifing addresses, is that they 
are sensitive to the distribution of responses across categories. The fewer 
responses per category, the less stable the estimate of percentage correct, 
The higher the calibration score will tend to be. This would introduce an 
inevitable confound in comparisons between subjects using different numbers of 
categories (as they were forced to do here). Because the groups as a whole 
produced similar distributions of responses, this problem is greatly reduced 
with pooled data. 
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Percentage 1.0 Responses 
Using 
Prop. Mean Over- % of % 
Group N .5 1.0 Correct Confidence Confidence Calibration Total Correct 
Sort-and-label 
3 piles 50 88.0 50.oa,b,c .586 .694a,b .109 .0212 12.7a,b,c 77 .1 
4 piles 42 88.0 so.oa .592 .715 .122 .0236 21.6a 77 .4 
5 piles 38 92.1 89.5b .601 .743a .142 .0281 21.6b 81.0 
6 piles 45 93.3 91. lC .604 • 717 .113 .0261 14.5d 78.7 
All Sort 175 90.3 76.6d .595 .716 .120 .0235 17.2e 78.6 
Unconstrained 
All** 48 95.8 97.ga,d .617 .737b .121 .0238 24.6c,d,e 80.4 
Using 6 
Categ. 35 100 100 .625 .746 .121 .0227 23.6 82.8 
* Entries with a common superscript by column differ significantly (p<.01). All tests are 
jackknifed t-tests. 
** Data from Lichtenstein & Fischhoff [15]. 
Group N 
3 piles 29 
6 piles 30 
























• 778a .166a,b 
.764 .139 
Unconstrained 














* Entries with a common superscript by column differ significantly (p(.01); those for mean 
confidence, overconfidence, and calibration differ at p(.05. 
** Data from Lichtenstein & Fischhoff [15]. 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Calibration curves for the 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-pile groups of 
Experiment 1, compared with the calibration of subjects in Figure 9 of 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff [14]. 
Figure 2. Calibration curves for the 3-pile and 6-pile groups of 
Experiment 2, compared with subjects from Lichtenstein and Fischhoff [14]. 
Figure 3. Calibration curves for users and non-users of 1.0 in Experiment 
2. (Note: For the non-users group, the data in the range .6-.69 comprised so 


















- - - 4-Pile 
----- 5-Pile 
• • · • • • • ••• • • 6-Pile 













Cl) ,._ ,._ 











• • • • • 6- Pile 
.. ~ 






I : • I : 
I .: ·---------·· . 
.6 
Figure 2. 





•••• ••• •• 




















-- UHdl.0 47 
---·- Didn't Uu 1.0 12 



















.--------------. - . 
T--· 
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 
Probability 
Figure 3. 
1.0 
